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The Liability of Providers of Alcohol:
Dram Shop Acts?
The use of alcohol in a mechanized society produces potentially devas-
tating results. Yet the area of civil liability for providers of alcohol re-
mains inconsistent and unresponsive to the needs of victims of alcohol-
related accidents. This comment seeks to identify the policies surrounding
liability of providers of alcohol as well as to propose a suggested "dram
shop" act which will further these goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advance of technology, alcohol-related legislation and
case law have taken on increasing significance.' In today's mobile
society, over ninety-five million people drive automobiles and sev-
enty million people consume alcoholic beverages with some fre-
quency.2 This mixture creates the possibility for devastating
injury. Auto accidents in the United States take more than 50,000
lives and produce more than 2,000,000 disabling personal injuries
per year.3 Furthermore, these accidents have an enormous eco-
nomic cost.4 Despite these statistics, however, the law relating to
1. As one court has noted:
When most people walked and few had horses or carriages, or even in
the days when the horse and buggy was a customary mode of travel, it
may have been that the common law rule of non-liability arising from the
sale of liquor to an intoxicated person was satisfactory. But the situation
then and the problem in today's society of the imbiber going upon the
public highways and operating a machine, that requires quick response of
mind and muscle and capable of producing mass death and destruction
are vastly different.
Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 398, 409, 462 P.2d 54, 65 (1969) (expressly overruled in
Algria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980)) (Prather, J., concurring spe-
cially in result).
2. Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A. J. 995 (1968). It has
been estimated that at least one out of every ten drivers on Friday and Saturday
nights is legally drunk. Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1982, at Hi, col. c (citing the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
3. Cramton, supra note 2, at 995.
The statistics are staggering: 26,000 people (at least 8,800 of them teen-
agers) die at the hands of drunk drivers every year, more than die as a
result of handguns every year, more than the population of Gaithersburg,
Md. On an average day, 71 Americans are killed and 2,000 persons are in-
jured in alcohol-related accidents, according to the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration....
Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1982, at HI, col. c.
4. In 1981, the total economic cost for alcohol-related accidents in New Jersey
the control and distribution of alcohol remains wholly inadequate.
In the area of civil liability for providers of alcoholic beverages,
the law is based upon arbitrary distinctions and capricious classi-
fications. 5 The tremendous importance of this area of the law to
so many victims of alcohol-related accidents demands close exam-
ination, and perhaps change, in a system that should yield the
fairest and most equitable results.
This comment will review the various legal systems that deal
with the liability of providers of alcoholic beverages. The basic
principles within this area of the law will be discussed to provide
a foundational structure from which an equitable and fair system
may be derived. Finally, these principles will be applied to pro-
pose a statutory system intended to accomplish the above-men-
tioned goals.
II. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY: THE INABILITY OF THE COURTS
A. Traditional Common Law Liability for Providers of
Alcoholic Beverages
Traditionally, society has professed deep concern with the con-
trol of alcohol. There are a myriad of statutory provisions control-
ling its distribution.6 Virtually any commercial endeavor in which
alcohol is involved requires either a license or a permit and virtu-
ally every state has an Alcoholic Beverage Control Board or its
equivalent which monitors and supervises the disposition of alco-
holic beverages. Furthermore, alcohol is subject to specific taxes,
which usually are quite heavy. 7 Finally, during the distribution
process, before the final sale to a consumer, there are a variety of
regulations concerning the time, place and manner in which alco-
hol may be dispensed.8 However, post-sale problems seem to be
alone was $1,594,497,898. This figure includes economic cost arising from deaths,
personal injuries and property damages. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 545 n.3,
476 A.2d 1219, 1222 n.3 (1984). These figures would appear to be consistent with
nationwide statistics on this subject. See id. and authorities cited therein.
5. See infra notes 15, 17, 103-21 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23000-25762 (West 1968 & Supp. 1984)
(Alcoholic Beverages); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43 (Smith-Hurd 1944 & Supp. 1984) (Li-
quor Control Act); MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 436 (West 1978 & Supp. 1984) (Liquor);
N.Y. ALco. BEV. CoNT. LAw §§ 60-99-d (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. TAx LAw §§ 420-45 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983) (statutes
concerning taxes on alcoholic beverages). For an example of specific rates of tax,
see id. at § 424.
8. See generally CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23000-25762 (West 1968 & Supp.
1984) (Alcoholic Beverages); MICH. Comn'. LAws ANN. §§ 435.19-C, 436.46 (Liquor)
(West 1978 & Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CoNT. LAw § 1-155 (McKinney 1970 &
Supp. 1983-84); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 35-2-1- 35-4-93 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (Al-
coholic Beverages).
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left in the neglected disarray of a legal ashheap.9 As a result, the
law in the area of post-sale damages and injuries has become a
confusing patchwork consisting of a variety of different legislative
enactments as well as differing distortions and exceptions under
the common law.1O
The traditional common law has done little to alleviate post-sale
problems pertaining to the provision of alcohol." Courts have wo-
ven a unique web of legal principles dealing with actions by plain-
tiffs injured or damaged by intoxicated persons against
defendants who had provided the means of intoxication. Al-
though tavern keepers are charged with a duty to control order
within their premises and ensure the safety of their patrons, 12
courts have traditionally drawn the line at this, imposing no fur-
ther duties. Despite basic tort principles pertaining to the actions
of third parties,iS courts have chosen not to adhere to these prin-
ciples.14 Although legislation characteristically stops upon the
sale of alcoholic beverages to the consumer, tort law, un-
hampered, may have been able to handle the post-sale problems.
However, the courts have destroyed the capacity of tort law to eq-
9. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. In an attempt to head off confusion that may arise from the terminology
used, the following explanations are offered. Throughout this article:
a. The traditional common law rule is the name given to the early common law
developed by the courts which held that, as a matter of law, the person who con-
sumes alcohol is the proximate cause of the inebriation, and the act of selling alco-
hol is too remote to be proximate;
b. The modern common law rule is the name given to the law developed by the
courts that uses negligence standards in the review of cases without the direct im-
position of the traditional common law rule (the modern common law rule has
different variations depending on factors such as whether the courts rely on the
violation of statute to impute liability);
c. Common law negligence is the area of law that this comment is concerned
with, so the unembellished use of the term common law principles refers to the
principles that are relevant to this article, namely common law negligence;
d. Pure (standard, general) common law negligence is an attempt to put a label
on the generic elemental negligence cause of action (i.e., the concepts of duty and
a breach of duty);
12. Farreli, Liability of Tavern Owners Under the New York State Dram Shop
Act, 30 ALB. L. REV. 271, 272 (1966) (tavern keepers owe a high standard of care
towards patrons within their establishment).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965). "If the likelihood that a
third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, inten-
tionaly tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm
caused thereby." Id.
14. See infra notes 18-46 and accompanying text.
uitably adjudicate lawsuits concerning the providers of alcoholic
beverages by creating arbitrary exceptions resulting in defendant
immunities.1 5
The traditional common law rule developed by the courts is
that, as a matter of law, the person who consumes alcohol is the
proximate cause of the inebriation and the act of selling alcohol is
too remote.1 6 Thus, any injury or damage that is caused by an in-
ebriated person is the sole responsibility of that person, and in no
circumstance may the provider of the alcohol become culpable.
Such an absolute precept runs contrary to the principles of tort
law.17
15. For examples of non-liability rules imposed by courts, see, e.g., Cowlier v.
Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945) (overruled in Ontiveros v. Borak, 36 Ariz.
500, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983); see ifra note 41); Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385
S.W.2d 656 (1965); Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329
(1943); Stringer v. Calmes, 167 Kan. 278, 205 P.2d 921 (1949); Waler's Adm'r v. Col-
linsworth, 144 Ky. 3, 137 S.W. 766 (1911); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183
So. 2d 328 (1966) (overruled in Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831, 838 (La. 1976));
State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Hall v. Budagher, 76
N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966) (overruled in Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269
(1982), see infra note 42).
16. See, e.g., Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 356, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955) (overruled
in Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 286 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971)) ("as to a
competent person it is the voluntary consumption not the sale or gift, of intoxicat-
ing liquor which is the proximate cause of injury from its use"); Cruse v. Aden, 127
Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889) (sale of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate
cause of injuries subsequently received by the purchaser because of his intoxica-
tion). Cf. Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in Cal fornia 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 46, 48
(1973) (an injured person could only recover from the consumer; if the buyer were
the plaintiff, the vendor had the defense of contributory negligence).
17. Negligence involves standards of reasonable care by a person of ordinary
prudence under the same or similar circumstances. The action of an ordinary pru-
dent person is dependent upon the circumstances involved. This is a highiy deter-
minative and variable factor entangled in any negligence action. To formally
adjudge that the providing of a drink can never be a negligent act is contrary to
tort theory. In 1949, Justice Dooling, in the California case of Fleckner v. Dionne,
94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949), recognized the incompatability of the tradi-
tional common law approach with basic tort theory. In his dissent, Justice Dooling
stated
I frankly admit that the cases from other jurisdictions are all to the effect
that in the absence of statute no remedy exists against the dispenser of
liquor for injuries resulting to third persons from the acts of intoxicated
persons. However, considered as questions of the law of negligence and
proximate cause, I cannot bow to the reasoning of those decisions when
carried to the full extreme of holding that under no circumstances can one
who dispenses liquor to another knowing that he is becoming intoxicated
be liable to a third person later injured by the intoxicated person's con-
duct; and I can see no reason for perpetuating in the law of this state the
error of the courts of other jurisdictions.
Negligence is measured by what a person of ordinary prudence would or
would not do under the same or similar circumstances and it is thoroughly
settled that negligence may be the proximate cause of an injury to an-
other even though the act of a third person intervenes, if a person of ordi-
nary prudence could reasonably anticipate the probability of the third
person's intervening conduct.
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By adhering to the traditional common law rule, the courts have
indirectly limited the duty of care owed by a person through
changing the standards of proximate cause. Because a provider
of a drink can never be the proximate cause of an injury, he effec-
tively has no duty whatsoever to either the intoxicated person or
the public at large.18 The use of ordinary tort standards for negli-
gence would not provide such a vehicle for absolute immunity to
the vendor. The genesis for the shift in position by the courts is
difficult to fathom in light of the existence of tort standards which
would serve society in this area of the law with the same integrity
as other areas of tort law are served.19 A seller would not be lia-
ble in instances in which it would be unreasonable or unfair to
hold him liable.20 The rationale utilized by the courts in adopting
the traditional common law rule is based upon two premises. 21
First, once a customer leaves a bartender's establishment, the
bartender has no control over the intoxicated person.22 Second, a
person who voluntarily becomes inebriated should bear his own
Id. at 251-52, 210 P.2d at 534. See also Keenan, supra note 16, at 48-49 (traditional
common law rule was based upon "outmoded reasoning" and was ripe for disap-
proval by the courts); cf. Farrell, supra note 12. For example, are tort theories
properly served, when, after a bartender serves an intoxicated minor alcohol and
the minor subsequently injures another after losing control of his automobile, the
court holds that as a matter of law the server of the drink has no legal liability?
(this being so despite the fact that the server violated standards of reasonable
care). See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
18. This stance seems to put the courts in a position contrary to the purposes
of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Acts. The purposes of the Acts involved "in the
highest degree, the economic, social, and moral well being and safety of the State
and all its people." Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 248, 210 P.2d 530, 532
(1949).
19. For a case with a strong fact pattern that begs for the application of usual
tort standards, see Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959), and a dis-
cussion of this case supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
20. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
The words "reasonable man" denote a person exercising those qualities of
attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of
its members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of
others. It enables those who are to determine whether the actor's conduct
is such as to subject him to liability for harm caused thereby, to express
their judgment in terms of the conduct of a human being. The fact that
this judgment is personified in a "man" calls attention to the necessity of
taking into account the fallibility of human beings.
Id. at Comment b.
21. For a discussion of the basis for the court's adoption of the traditional
common law rule, see Dooley & Mosher, Alcohol and Legal Negligence, 7 CONrEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 145, 158 (1978). See also McClintock, Common Law Remedy for Neg-
ligent Acts of the Drunk, 5 TULSA L.J. 289 (1968).
22. Dooley & Mosher, supra note 21, at 158.
responsibilities. 23 These arguments ignore the fact that, in each
case of negligence, these circumstances would be reckoned with.
Therefore, the traditional common law rule becomes difficult to
defend. Furthermore, the first premise assumes that because the
intoxicated person will leave the control of the bartender, this
provides sufficient reason to grant a bartender the license to
launch an intoxicated person onto the streets, whatever the fore-
seeable consequences may be.
The traditional common law rule's absolute blanket protection
of a class of defendants is contrary to the basic theories of tort
law.24 The early courts were erroneously overconfident in their
ability to categorize circumstances in which a sale of alcohol
would take place.25 Accepting the idea that, in all cases and cir-
cumstances, a provider of alcohol was acting prudently does not
sustain the rationale for an attack upon the negligence duty anal-
ysis with a proximate cause adjustment. If a court believes the
basis for the traditional common law rule is sound, then that
court can rest confident that future courts would similarly find,
case by case, that no duty exists under ordinary tort principles.
An identical result would be assured by the pure and natural op-
eration of tort law. The traditional common law rule becomes a
capricious act by the courts which serves no purpose, save to pro-
vide an arbitrary zone of safety for the fortunate, but undeserv-
ing, defendant.
Arizona originally held to the traditional common law rule of li-
ability limitation.26 In Collier v. Stamati, 27 a fifteen-year-old girl
was sold a "tall drink of highly intoxicating liquor."28 This child
drank the liquor and became intoxicated.29 In an action by the
mother against the tavern owner, it was held that the girl was the
author of her own injury.3 0
The question considered by the court was whether the child
possessed the will, choice or discretion to consume the bever-
23. Id. See, e.g., Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 443, 226 A.2d 383, 389 (1967)
(no liability for injuries at places and in circumstances outside the defendant's
knowledge or control).
24. See supra note 17.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940) (overruled in On-
tiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1983)) (traditional common law
was adhered to, despite dissent. The dissent felt the issue was beyond the powers
of the court and should have been left to the legislature).
27. 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945).
28. Id. at 287, 162 P.2d at 126.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 290, 162 P.2d at 128 (mother of the child brought suit claiming she
had been deprived inter alia of the services of her child).
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age.3 1 This was answered in the affirmative, resulting in the claim
against the tavern owner being denied.32 The court implied that
the only way the tavern owner could have been liable was if the
child was found to have no volitional choice in consuming the al-
cohol.3 3 Thus, the court's intimation is that liability would attach
to the bar owner only if the actual action of drinking could be im-
puted directly to him. This result follows regardless of the age of
the child involved so long as the child possesses the requisite will,
choice or discretion.3 4
An ordinary negligence standard, on the other hand, would con-
sider all the circumstances when deciding whether the tavern
keeper violated a duty established under a reasonable person
standard. In a later Arizona case,35 a minor consumed eight to
ten beers in the defendant's bar before purchasing hard liquor
and additional beer from a co-defendant. He then jumped from a
roof at least three stories high into a pool. 36 While an Arizona ap-
pellate court stated that there should be some remedy,37 it never-
theless felt itself bound by the strict traditional common law
rule.38 Issues of fact, such as whether the defendants knew that
the plaintiff was both a minor and intoxicated, and whether the
defendants were a proximate cause of the injuries never reached
the trial court.
Even in the face of the violation of a statute the common law
31. "It is to be considered whether the child... was capable in law of having
or giving effect to her own will to consume or to refuse the drink she had caused to
be set before her." Id. at 290, 162 P.2d at 127.
32. Id. at 290, 162 P.2d at 128.
33. For other courts that have grappled with the same issue, see, e.g., Cole v.
Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351
(1962).
34. This approach was recognized by the Arizona Supreme Court to include
any person, notwithstanding the age, who did not have the discretion or will to re-
fuse a drink. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940) (sale of alcoholic bever-
ages to habitual drunkard).
35. Valentine v. Azar, 8 Ariz. App. 247, 445 P.2d 449 (1968) (overruled in On-
tiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983)).
36. The minor landed in the pool he was aiming for, but still suffered thirty to
thirty-two fractures in the bones in his feet. When deposed, he stated that he
purchased and consumed the alcohol because "it was camp, so to speak" to drink
while a minor. Valentine, 8 Ariz. App. at 249, 445 P.2d at 451.
37. Id.
38. The court recognized that if the child had no will, choice or discretion, lia-
bility may have been imposed. However, the court found that under the facts of
the case, with a twenty-year-old college student, such a lack of will was not sup-
ported. Id. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
has denied liability. In Hall v. Budagher,39 the New Mexico
Supreme Court considered an action for wrongful death arising
out of an automobile accident. Despite the fact that a customer
was under the severe influence of alcohol, the defendant tavern
owner continued to serve him liquor. The tavern owner knew that
the customer had driven to the bar and would later drive home.
At closing, the bar owner evicted the patron from the bar.40 An
action was brought against the tavern keeper by a party who was
injured by the intoxicated customer.4 1 After reviewing case his-
tory from throughout the United States,42 the Supreme Court of
New Mexico decided that despite the fact that a negligent sale
may have been involved, or a sale in violation of statute or regula-
tion, sellers were not liable as a matter of law to an injured third
person.43
In 1977, the New Mexico Supreme Court again denied recovery
based upon the strict traditional common law rule." The court,
however, recognized the seriousness of alcohol abuse and its con-
sequences, and called for legislative action in the area of third
party liability.4 5 The court did not change the law, but held that it
39. 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966).
40. The intoxicated person caused an automobile collision with Hall, the de-
fendant, dying as a direct result of the customer's intoxicated condition. Id. at 592,
417 P.2d at 72.
41. The action was supported by the claim that the bar owner had violated
state liquor regulations.
Regulation No. 31 - Sale to intoxicated person
No dispensary, retailer or club licensee shall sell, serve or deliver alco-
holic beverages to any person who is obviously in an intoxicated
condition.
Regulation No. 32 - Urging persons to purchase alcoholic beverages and
sharing proceeds from drinks served by employees
No dispenser, retailer or club licensee shall urge, entice, or induce any
person to purchase alcoholic beverages or shall permit any employee to
urge, entice or induce any person to purchase alcoholic beverages, nor
shall any dispenser or club licensee pay any employee any share of pro-
ceeds from drinks served by said employee.
Regulations of New Mexico Division of Liquor Control, Nos. 31, 32, as cited by the
court in Hall, 76 N.M. at 593, 417 P.2d at 72-73.
42. 76 N.M. 594-95, 417 P.2d 73-74.
43. This was supported with the argument that it was within the province of
the legislature to change the law by enacting a dram shop act. Since there was no
such enactment, the legislature was seen to approve the traditional common law.
Id. at 595, 417 P.2d at 74.
44. Marchiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d 1160 (1977) (overruled in Lopez
v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982)); see supra note 42).
45. Marchiondo, 90 N.M. at 369, 563 P.2d at 1162. Cf. Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz.
567, 596 P.2d 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (the court calls to higher authority within the
court system to change the rule to impose liability). "Liability can and should be
imposed .... What has been created by the courts can be undone by the courts.
Were we the Supreme Court of this state, we would abolish the anachronistic and
illogical common law rule and subject the bar owner to liability." Id. at 572, 596
P.2d at 710. In Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983), the
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would not be improper for it to address the issue in the future.4 6
B. Modern Common Law Liability for Providers of Alcoholic
Beverages
1. General Move to a Modern Common Law Rule
Modernly, the potential numerosity and severity of actions in-
volving drinking drivers47 has become too serious to be ignored.46
The courts are beginning to acknowledge that they can no longer
afford to indulge in arbitrary quirks of the law that result in mani-
festly inadequate awards to victims. 49 As a result, some courts
have taken the initiative and begun to change the traditional com-
mon law rule of absolute non-liability for tavern keepers.5 0 The
landmark change in the common law occurred in the New Jersey
Supreme Court and concurrently in the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The New Jersey Supreme Court took the plunge in Rappaport
v. Nichols51 in 1959. In Rappaport, an intoxicated minor was
served liquor in defendant's bar. The plaintiff was injured as a re-
sult of an automobile accident involving the intoxicated youth.52
The law in New Jersey prohibited the sale of liquor to both mi-
nors and intoxicated persons. The court relied upon a standard of
foreseeability to create a duty of care under the tort theory of
negligence. 53 Specifically, the court held that a tavern operator
could foresee the risk of harm resulting from the intoxication of
his patron, especially when it was known that the patron would
Supreme Court of Arizona responded by abolishing the common law doctrine of
non-liability, substituting instead the standard of reasonable duty of care.
46. In Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982), the New Mexico
Supreme Court took the step and recognized common law liability. This liability
was limited, however, to creation of duty by violation of statute or regulation
which prohibited the serving of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person.
47. "Because automobiles were a relatively new device, the problem of driving
while intoxicated was, of course, not the devastating menace it is today." Ross v.
Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 119, 200 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1972).
48. See supra notes 1-4.
49. Id. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
51. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
52. Id. at 192-93, 156 A.2d at 3.
53. For a discussion of an action that included a claim of gross negligence
thereby including an element of reckless and wanton misconduct, see Note, Dram
Shops: Third-Party Recovery for Reckless and Wanton Misconduct 3 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 769 (1981).
be driving intoxicated upon leaving the bar.54 Further, when this
duty was breached, the tavern keeper became liable for damages
accruing from the breach. This position was supported by the be-
lief that laws prohibiting sales to minors and/or intoxicated per-
sons were enacted not only to protect the minor and/or
intoxicated person, but also the public at large.55
Concurrently with Rappaport, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store.56 In
Waynick, a Michigan resident was injured by an Illinois resident
who had become intoxicated in an Illinois bar. The injured Michi-
gan resident brought an action against the Illinois tavern. The
court noted that although both states had enacted Dram Shop
Acts, 57 neither act applied extra-territorially. 58 Therefore, the
court turned to the common law of Michigan, the state in which
the injury occurred.5 9
The court determined that the existence of dram shop acts was
irrelevant to the decision anyway, because the criminal code sec-
tion of Illinois was enacted for the protection of "any member of
the public who might be injured or damaged as a result of drunk-
enness to which the particular sale of alcoholic liquor contrib-
utes." 60 This was deemed sufficient to create the requisite duty
necessary for a negligence action.
To complete the creation of a duty, the court reasoned that the
statutes that prohibited sales to minors and/or intoxicated per-
sons were intended to protect the general public, of which the
54. "[T]his is particularly evident in current times when traveling by car to
and from the tavern is so commonplace and accidents resulting from drinking are
so frequent." 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
55. See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 94
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85), which states:
This [Liquor Control] Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that the
health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be
protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be
fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the
manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.
Id.; accord CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984).
56. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
57. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 18993 (Callaghan 1980 & Supp. 1983).
58. 269 F.2d at 324.
59. As the court noted:
[WIhere the question relates to the choice between the law of the place
where the negligent act or omission took place and the law of the place
where the injury or death or both were inflicted, by the almost unanimous
concensus of decision the place of the tort, within the contemplation of
the rule that the law of the situs of the tort governs the liability and sub-
stantive matters, is the place where the injury or death was inflicted and
not the place where the negligent act or omission took place.
Id. at 325 (quoting 133 A.L.R. 260, 263 (1941)).
60. 269 F.2d at 325.
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plaintiff was a member.6 1 The court had beaten a path back from
the traditional common law rules into the area of general common
law principles of negligence.
These early cases establishing the modern common law rule
placed heavy reliance upon penal statutes to establish the duty
owed by a tavern keeper.62 However, it was not long before the
existence of liability was recognized independent of penal stat-
utes. In Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 63 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized that where the serv-
ing of alcoholic beverages is concerned, there "is a duty which
everyone owes to society and to law entirely apart from any stat-
ute."64 The duty recognized was "to stop pouring alcohol" into a
person, who "because of alcohol, lost control over his reflexes,
judgment and sense of responsibility to others."65
This alteration in the law may have been viewed by the courts
as a radical departure from existing law. However, upon closer
examination, this turnabout in the law was an application of ordi-
nary and familiar negligence principles. 66 This modification in the
law did not necessarily and absolutely shift all liability to tavern
keepers, nor did it impose a court-legislated dram shop act. Sim-
ply, an inexplicable and unsteady foundational aberration in this
area of tort law was removed.67 Thus, the case trilogy of Rap-
paport, Waynick, and Jardine charted a full move from the artifi-
cial traditional common law rule to the self-sufficient common law
principles of ordinary negligence actions. 68
61. Id.at 325-26.
62. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 72-74,
85-86 and accompanying text.
63. 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
64. Id. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553.
65. Id. This position was also recently followed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222.
66. See, e.g., Comment, Dram Shop Liability---A Judicial Response, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 995, 1007 (1969).
67. For a discussion of a complete integration into the ordinary principles of
the tort field, including concepts of contributory negligence, see Binchy, Tort Neg-
ligence-Breach of Statutory Duty-Common Law Duty of Care-Affirmative Du-
ties-Contributory Negligence-Volenti; Volenti Non Fit Injuria-Ex Turpi Causa
Non Oritur Action-Drink Now - Sue Later, 53 CAN. B. REV. 344 (1975). Cf. Sym-
mons, Contributory Negligence Defenses for The Drunken Driver, 40 MOD. L. REV.
350 (1977).
68. "The treatment of the problem ... shows that the new common law con-
sists of nothing more revolutionary than a case-by-case application of traditional
negligence principles." Comment, supra note 66, at 1007.
2. Adoption of the Modern Common Law Rule Under a
Limited Basis
Rappaport and Waynick represented early small steps in a new
direction to the then-existing law. These cases, though revolu-
tionary in concept, chose to depend upon statutes for the estab-
lishment of a duty. Jardine represented the last step into
independent tort law, in that liability was imposed without the
assistance of penal statutes. Not all courts have gone as far as
Jardine. Davis v. Shiappacosee,69 decided in 1963 by the
Supreme Court of Florida, was an action for the wrongful death of
a sixteen-year-old boy. The bar involved took orders for alcoholic
beverages from patrons who were seated in their cars, and then
delivered the ordered beverages to the cars.7 0 On one night, three
minors, ages sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen years old, were de-
livered twenty-four cans of beer and a half-pint of whiskey with-
out an inquiry as to their age.71 The sixteen-year-old was driving.
The court discussed the circumstances of the sale in terms of the
foreseeability of events. It was noted that "the purchasers were
but boys . .. [and they were] seated in a dangerous instrumen-
tality.. -.72 However, the court pulled up short and reduced this
reasoning to dicta, by holding that the sale of alcoholic beverages
to minors in violation of statute constituted negligence per se.73
The court had thus limited its decision to the creation of a duty
arising from the violation of statute.74
California took almost a decade to catch up with the move to
the modern common law. Until 1971, California strictly adhered to
the traditional common law rule that the consumption, rather
than the provision, of alcoholic beverages was the proximate
cause of intoxication.75 Thus, actions against providers of alcohol
were aborted through dismissal in the pretrial stage.
In 1971, the Supreme Court of California, in an unanimous deci-
69. 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963).
70. Id. at 366.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 367.
73. The facts of the case were determined to be so similar to the previous case
of Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So. 2d 189 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959), as to require
identical rulings. 155 So. 2d at 367-68.
74. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.11 (West Supp. 1984).
To be distinguished is the creation of a duty without the use of the legal theory
of violation of statute, but rather the direct operation of the reasonable person
standard. See supra note 17 for a brief discussion of the scope of this standard.
75. See, e.g., Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955) (liquor seller not
liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated patron to himself); Fleckner v. Dionne,
94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949) (liquor seller not liable for injuries caused
by an intoxicated patron to third parties) (disapproved in Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.
3d 153, 167, 486 P.2d 151, 160-61, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 632-33 (1971)).
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sion penned by Chief Justice White, handed down the landmark
case of Vesely v. Sager.76 In this case, the court held that the
traditional common law rule of nonliability for the providers of al-
cohol was "patently unsound."77
The plaintiff in the action had suffered personal injuries and
property damage as a result of an automobile accident. The de-
fendant owned and operated a tavern located near the top of a
mountain. The defendant knew the only route patrons of his es-
tablishment could take home was a very steep winding and nar-
row mountain road.78 Furthermore, he knew his patron had
become excessively intoxicated as a result of alcoholic beverages
he had served.7 9
The court reviewed the Waynick and RappaportBO cases, and
chose to join in the abandonment of the rule of nonliability. 81 The
law chosen to fill the legal void left by the abandonment of the old
analysis arose from the principles established "by cases dealing
with matters other than the furnishing of alcoholic beverages." 82
Under these principles "an actor may be liable if his negligence is
a substantial factor in causing an injury, and he is not relieved of
liability because of the intervening act of a third person if such an
act was reasonably foreseeable at the time of his negligent
conduct."83
The proximate cause distinction, founded solely on the circum-
stance that the consumption of a beverage is a voluntary act of
the intoxicated, was rejected by the court.84 The court recognized
that a sound system of liability could only rest upon concepts of
foreseeability that could be applied on a case-by-case basis. Anal-
ysis of tavern keepers' liability was correctly returned to the anal-
ysis of duty, and away from arbitrary distinctions within
proximate cause. However, in congruity with other courts that
had moved from the traditional common law, the California court
76. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
77. Id. at 157, 486 P.2d at 156, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
78. Id. at 158, 486 P.2d at 154, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
79. In fact, the bar owner continued to serve the patron for three hours after
the closing of the bar. Id.
80. Id. at 162-63, 486 P.2d at 157-58, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30.
81. To this end the earlier case of Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450
(1955), was overruled, and Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530
(1949), was disapproved. See supra note 75.
82. 5 Cal. 3d at 163, 486 P.2d at 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
83. Id.
84. Id.
spoke of a pure foreseeability standard, yet pulled up short in its
decision by basing its holding on the presumption of negligence
from the violation of a statute.8 5 The California statute which was
relied upon provides that the selling, furnishing or giving of alco-
holic beverages to any obviously intoxicated person is a misde-
meanor. 86 Further, the plaintiff was deemed to be a member of
the class of persons this statute was intended to protect.
The defendant's arguments against the changing of the tradi-
tional rule were countered by pointing out that the rule was origi-
nally court-created and thus subject to court change. 87 The
supreme court also pointed out that "[o]ther common law tort
rules which were determined to be lacking in validity have been
abrogated ... "88
Five years after the Vesely decision, the California Supreme
Court was forced to tighten its reasoning in the area of liability of
alcohol providers. In Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,89 the defendant
owned a gaming establishment in Nevada which served alcohol.
The driver of an automobile that collided with the plaintiff was in-
toxicated at the time of the accident as a result of alcohol pro-
vided by the defendant's establishment. 90 The California
Supreme Court was forced to move away from statutory crutches
and move towards a statute-free tort theory in grappling with the
question of which state's law was applicable. A duty based upon
the foreseeability of injury or damages as a result of the defend-
ant's actions was utilized.
The supreme court focused on the fact that the defendant knew
and expected California residents to respond to its advertise-
ments and solicitations. 91 Further, the defendant knew and ex-
pected California highways to be used in transit to his place of
85. [P Ilaintiff is within the class of persons for whose protection section
25602 was enacted and that the injuries he suffered resulted from an oc-
currence that the statute was designed to prevent. Accordingly, if these
two elements are proved at trial, and if it is established that [the defend-
ant] violated section 25602 and that the violation proximately caused
plaintiff's injuries, a presumption will arise that defendant was negligent
in furnishing alcoholic beverages ....
Id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32.
86. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1968).
87. Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 166, 486 P.2d at 160, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 632. This is antipo-
dean from the point of view of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Marchiando v.
Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d 1160 (1977). See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text.
88. 5 Cal. 3d at 166, 486 P.2d at 164, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
89. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
90. The intoxicated driver hit the plaintiff in the plaintiff's lane of travel. Id. at
316, 546 P.2d at 720, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
91. Id. at 319, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
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business.92 It was reasoned that this theory would not be an im-
pairment of Nevada interests because the law would only put lia-
bility on those Nevada businesses that "actively solicit California
business." 93 Therefore, a duty was imposed only upon those
whose actions produced a foreseeable result.
The defendant pointed out that in Vesely the court used a state
statute to impose civil liability. The California Supreme Court
countered by pointing out that, although no statute was applica-
ble to the case at bar, this did not "preclude recovery on the basis
of negligence apart from the statute." 94
Once the Supreme Court of California integrated actions
against tavern keepers into the ordinary theories of tort negli-
gence, it did not hesitate to make this integration as complete as
possible. In Coulter v. Superior Court,95 the idea that the creation
of a duty could be established by a pure foreseeability standard,
clear of any artificial barriers based upon defendant's status, was
strengthened. In the Coulter case, the court held that the status
of the provider of alcohol, as either commercial or noncommer-
cial, was irrelevant in and of itself in determining whether there
was liability.96 The court stressed that the actor's conduct in light
of his knowledge and foreseeability of a certain result were the
determinative factors in the creation of a duty.97
Absent legislative interference, the California Supreme Court
was well on its way to integrating the law of third party liability
for the providers of alcoholic beverages into a logical and cohesive
niche in tort negligence law. The court not only moved this area
of third party liability under general tort law, but also showed
that the movement was a complete one, independent of distinc-
tions based on the status of the defendent or the existence of pe-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 729, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
94. Id. at 325, 546 P.2d at 727, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
95. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
96. For an analysis of liability in California based upon whether the defendant
is a social host or a commercial vendor, see Comment, Social Host Liability For
Furnishing Alcohol: A Legal Hangover?, 10 PAC. L.J. 95 (1978); Dooley & Mosher,
Alcohol and Legal Negligence, 7 CONTEMP. DRUG. PROBS. 145, 165 (1978) (discus-
sion more national in scope).
97. "We think it evident that the service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously
intoxicated person by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to
drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to those on
the highway." 21 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (emphasis
supplied by the court).
nal statutes. 98
The modern common law system is available to the state courts
absent contrary state legislation.99 An advantage of the modern
system is that it provides a cohesive interface with existing negli-
gence law.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE IN THE AREA OF PROVIDER'S
LIABILITY
A. State Legislation
Dram shop acts involve the legislative imposition of civil liabil-
ity on providers of alcoholic beverages.100 Thus, these acts be-
come part of the scheme of compensation for people who have
been injured or damaged by an intoxicated person. Currently,
there are nineteen states that have some form of a dram shop
act.101 States that impose liability judicially, based upon the vio-
lation of criminal statutes, do not qualify as states with dram shop
acts. These states do not have the requisite legislatively imposed
civil liability; rather, they have used common law negligence prin-
ciples to impose civil liability via the violation of a statute.102
98. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
99. See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text. See also supra note 46 and
accompanying text. Contra supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
100. "[S]tatutes giving a right of action to persons injured by an intoxicated
person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, against the person
selling or furnishing the liquor which caused the intoxication, commonly known as
'civil damages acts,' or 'dram shop acts.'" 45 AM. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors
§ 553 (1969).
101. ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); GA. CODE § 3-3-23 (Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92
(West Supp. 1984-85); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.993 (Callaghan Supp. 1983); MiN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-121 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4399.01 (Page 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-11-1 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1
(Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977).
102. This type of imposition of liability can be seen in the application of the
modern common law rule. See supra notes 47-99 and accompanying text. Massa-
chusetts has passed a neutral act that neither imposes criminal sanctions nor civil
liability: "No alcoholic beverage shall be sold or delivered on any premises li-
censed under this chapter to a person who is known to be a drunkard, to an intoxi-
cated person, or to a person who is known to have been intoxicated within the six
months last preceding." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 138, § 69 (West 1974). The
courts of Massachusetts have used this statute to impose civil liability. Cimino v.
Milfords, 385 Mass. 323, 431 N.E.2d 920 (1982). The Oregon legislature, on the other
hand, has implicitly accepted the judicially created system of liability by limiting
liability in certain cases. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.950, 30.955, 30.906 (1980) (liability
of third parties only if person served was visibly intoxicated or for injuries caused
by minors; no liability unless a reasonable person would have requested identifi-
cation or suspected that such identification had been altered).
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Dram shop acts have taken many different forms. Typically,
some sort of strict liability is imposed on providers of alcoholic
beverages. For the most part, these acts do little in providing for
a cohesive system in which persons injured or damaged by intoxi-
cated persons are compensated. While dram shop acts represent
a step toward making providers of alcoholic beverages liable in
actions by victims of inebriated persons, the limitations in these
statutes lower their status to that of a second-best solution to the
traditional common law rule of nonliability.103
The most common type of statute usually provides for an action
by any person' 04 who is injured in person, property, or means of
support.' 05 States differ in the type of transfer of alcohol that is
required for the imposition of liability (for example, whether
there needs to be a sale or whether a gift is sufficient to impute
liability) 106 This issue becomes especially important when liabil-
ity is being imposed upon the social host. There is a split among
dram shop acts on the question of whether the provision of alco-
holic beverages must be in violation of the law.' 07 Most statutes
require that the liquor provided actually cause the intoxication of
103. The criticisms that apply to the traditional common law still apply to dram
shop acts. Dram shop acts do not represent a pure common law system. There-
fore, the solution that numerous courts have requested, a pure common law sys-
tem, is not provided for. See, e.g., supra note 17, see also supra notes 61-67 and
accompanying text.
104. Contra GA. CODE § 51-1-18 (1968) (where only the father may bring an ac-
tion, and in the case of his death, the mother, if and only if a minor was served
alcohol without permission from the parents).
105. Contra R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-11-2 (1956) (a provider of alcohol may only be lia-
ble to a husband, wife, parent, child, guardian or employer, and only if that person
gave notice in writing not to provide intoxicating beverages to the person causing
the injuries); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977) (a parent or guardian must give notice
that his/her ward is under 19, or a spouse or guardian must give notice that the
person who should provide support is not doing so by reason of habitual drunken-
ness. The provider of alcohol then becomes liable only to the person giving
notice).
106. Connecticut limits liability to those who sell liquor. CoNN. GEN. STAT. A.NN.
§ 30-102 (West 1975). Cf. ALAsKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1975) (liability is limited for
practical purposes to sellers, because of the limitation of actions to authorized li-
censed providers of alcoholic beverages, which are usually in the business of sell-
ing alcoholic beverages). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1983) (liability limited to
permittees or the local Alcohol Beverage Control Board). Minnesota has also lim-
ited its liability provisions to exclude social hosts. Cole v. City of Spring Lake
Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982).
107. Of the states with dram shop acts, the minority do not require a sale in
violation of law. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85);
Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977).
the person causing the injury, while others allow for actions
where the provision of alcohol merely contributes to the overall
intoxication.108
Besides differences in the basic cause of action provided for by
dram shop acts, there are differences in the limitations on the lia-
bility of providers of alcohol. Some states furnish limitations on
the amount that may be recovered in an action.1 09 This may be
determined by the amount of a bond that must be filed as a condi-
tion of doing business.10 Liability may further be limited to
cases in which specific persons have been served, usually minors
or habitual drunkards.ll It may even be a necessary condition to
recovery that written notification be given to the provider of alco-
hol stating that a particular individual should not be served
alcohol.12
In some instances the dram shop acts can be quite broad. 1 3
Some acts specifically allow for exemplary damages.114 A dram
shop act may also provide liability for the owner, lessee or tenant,
of the premises on which the alcoholic beverages were fur-
nished.115 This inclusion usually requires some form of knowl-
108. A minority of states impose liability for those who merely contributed to
the intoxication of the drinker. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 6-5-71 (1975); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06
(Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1983).
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975) (after stating that a "seller
shall pay just damages to the person injured," the legislature limits the recovery
to twenty thousand dollars per person, and an aggregate of fifty thousand dollars
per seller) (emphasis added); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984) (fifteen thousand dollar limit on injuries to the person or property of any
person and a twenty thousand dollar limit for loss of support resulting from death
or injury of any person); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 436.22 (West Supp. 1984-85)
(the surety that provides the bond, which is a necessary condition of doing busi-
ness in the sale of alcoholic beverages, is not liable past the amount of the bond,
although the licensee may be so liable); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-123 (1983) (five hun-
dred thousand dollar limitation per occurrence with proportional abatement for
multiple claims arising from a single occurrence).
110. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (West Supp. 1984-85).
111. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (Supp. 1983) (minor or a drunken per-
son); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973) (habitual drunkard); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-121 (1983) (minor); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977) (minor or habitual drunkard
who has neglected support duties).
112. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973) (notice by court, parent,
guardian, spouse or employer); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982) (notice
by order of department of liquor control); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977) (notice by
court, parent, guardian, spouse or dependent).
113. By "broad" it is meant that there are specific inclusions that may not be
available without express inclusion.
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002
(1983); N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAw § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT.
§ 12-5-502 (1977).
115. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501
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edge by the owner, lessee or tenant of the actions occurring on
his premises."l6 Finally, dram shop acts may provide for joint lia-
bility. 17 As a rule, a provider of alcohol, if found to be liable, is
liable for the total amount of damages. There are no provisions
that look to the determination of comparative fault between the
intoxicated person and the provider of alcohol."18
Dram shop acts become imperfect allocators of liability. On the
one side, they impose arbitrary limitations on recovery, such as to
the amount that can be recovered and from whom it may be re-
covered."l 9 On the other side there are arbitrarily overbroad pro-
visions that impute liability on an all-or-nothing basis which are
wholly inconsistent with the concepts of fault.120 Dram shop acts
thus alleviate inequities caused by the traditional common law
only to the extent that they at least conceptually impose some lia-
bility where previously there was none.121
B. The Reaction to State Legislation
Both legislatures and courts have reacted to the passage of
(1972). North Carolina expressly includes the local Alcohol Beverage Control
Board as a potential defendant. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1983).
116. Id.
117. The question as to which parties may be jointly liable varies among the
states that contain such a provision. ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975) ("joint or separate
action against the person intoxicated or the person who furnished the liquor");
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (person with knowledge of
alcoholic sale who owns, rents, leases, or permits the use of the building for such
use and the provider are jointly liable); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983)
(joint liability against provider and owner, lessee or person renting or leasing the
premises who had knowledge of illegal sale of alcohol); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 436.22(5) (West Supp. 1984-85) (surety who issued bond may be jointly liable but
only to the extent of the bond involved); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page
1982) (joint and severable liability for all contributors to intoxication of the indi-
vidual involved); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1 (1956) (provider and intoxicant jointly lia-
ble); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972) (joint liability for provider, intoxicant and
owner of building).
118. Even courts have tended not to apply doctrines that distribute liability or
provide negligence defenses in the absence of statutory provisions. See, e.g.,
Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1964) (contributory negligence defense held
inapplicable because the gravamen of a Dram Shop Action is violation of statute
rather than negligence); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972) (citing
Zucker); but see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-124 (1983) (joint and several liability for
negligent driver of a vehicle and furnisher of alcohol with a right to contribution).
119. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 113-17 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
dram shop acts. The manner of such response has varied accord-
ing to the powers Qf the body making the response.
The court's influence over dram shop acts has come within the
purview of its task of interpreting statutory language. 22 A point
upon which courts place particular importance is the question of
which parties may be litigants in an action under a dram shop act.
The distinction most frequently employed is one between social
hosts 123 and commercial sellers,124 with most courts trying to limit
dram shop liability to commercial sellers. 125 As a holdover from
traditional common law, courts usually do not include the intoxi-
cated person as a party who may bring a cause of action against a
provider of alcohol.126 This appears to have become an absolute
rule in some jurisdictions.127 Another area in which the courts dif-
fer in their interpretations of dram shop acts is on the issue of the
patron's contributory negligence.128 A particularly vulnerable
area of court interpretation is causation, with attack coming from
122. Some courts have gone to the extreme and skirted the whole issue of dram
shop acts. See, e.g., Tadey v. Estate of Doe, No. 1: W73G, 1118 L Illinois Circuit
Court (Will County) 12th Circuit (1973) (the plaintiff received a verdict for ninety
thousand dollars which is more than the thirty-five thousand dollar ceiling on re-
coveries under the Illinois dram shop act. A recovery independent of the dram
shop act, however, removed the possibility of a no-fault recovery as provided for
by the dram shop act. The case was settled after the verdict by the trial court and
was not appealed).
123. Throughout this paper, a social host encompasses persons who provide al-
cohol either gratuituously in a social gathering, or persons who are not engaged in
the business of providing alcohol, and thus do not need to procure a license from
an alcohol control board.
124. A commercial seller includes those persons who engage in the business of
providing alcohol, and thus are required to obtain a license from an alcohol control
board. Commercial sellers and social hosts are mutually exclusive groups, i.e.,
while an act of a party might transfer his status at any time from one group to
another, the party cannot be both at once.
125. See, e.g., LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967) ("it is
not the law that private individuals are liable for the actions of their social guests
who over-indulge in the liquid hospitality provided at private homes or parties." 7
Mich. App. at 643, 152 N.W.2d at 713). Contra Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200
N.W.2d 149 (1972); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972) (the Iowa
dram shop act has been reenacted as IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984-
85)). See generally Case Comment, Civil Damages Act-Preemption of Social
Hosts' Common Law Liability: Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N. W.2d 836
(Minn. 1982), 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 489 (1982).
126. See, e.g., Campbell v. Village of Silver Bay, 315 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1963) (ap-
plying the law of Minnesota); Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892
(1955); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966) (expressly over-
ruled in Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831, 838 (La. 1976)).
127. See generally Campbell v. Village of Silver Bay, 315 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1963)
(wife could not recover loss of support from vendor where intoxicated husband in-
jured himself).
128. See, e.g., Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the
Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WLLAMETrE L. J. 561, 585-86 (1980).
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both the case-by-case interpretation of facts, and from the analyti-
cal interpretation of causation theory.
Legislative reactions to dram shop acts have ranged from minor
amendments to the repeal of whole statutes. 129 The California ex-
perience is unique in that the state has had extensive legislative
and judicial activity in the area of dram shop acts.130 This in-
terchange of activity is thus illustrative of the reactions of differ-
ent bodies of the government. Therefore, a discussion of
California's background in this area is fruitful.
Originally, California adhered to the traditional common law
rule of nonliability for the provider of alcohol.131 In the early
1970's a string of cases was decided by the California Supreme
Court which changed California's posture to that of a modern
common law state, where liability was dependent upon ordinary
negligence concepts of fault.' 32
In 1978, the California legislature took action in this area by
passing an anti-dram shop act.133 The legislature removed provid-
ers of alcohol from the class of persons who may have been liable
to a person injured by an intoxicated person. 34 In this promulga-
tion, the key cases of the California Supreme Court that devel-
oped the modern common law were specifically cited, and the
129. States that have recently repealed their dram shop acts are Oklahoma,
Washington and Wisconsin.
130. See supra notes 75-98 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
133. This was codified in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b),(c) (West Supp.
1984), which provides:
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished,
or given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such
person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by
the consumer of such alcoholic beverage.
(c) The legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted
so that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bern-
hard v. Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court (-
Cal. 3d -) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding
the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alco-
holic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another
by an intoxicated person.
134. Id. Previous to amendment, the statute merely stated: "Every person who
sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic
beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated per-
son is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964) (re-
tained as section (a) of current section 25602).
holdings declared to be abrogated.135 The traditional common law
doctrine, which stated that, as a matter of law, the consumption of
alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by
one who is intoxicated, was legislatively imposed.
In addition, the legislature delineated a set of circumstances
and provided that when such circumstances arose, a provider of
alcohol would be liable to a person who suffered injury.136 The
court's reponse was manifested in the case of Cory v. Shierloh.137
The constitutionality of the statute was upheld,138 and California
thus returned to the traditional common law system, with a slight
aberration for the inclusion of liability for those providing alcohol
to obviously intoxicated minors.
Legislative response to the dram shop acts has ranged from
tinkering with the specifics of an act to outright repeal.139 If there
is an act in force, the changing of provisions is significant only to
the people who have been specifically affected. As far as the prac-
tical reality is concerned, these statutory changes only shift arbi-
trary distinctions in a system that has already classified persons
and circumstances.4 0 Fault in any circumstance takes a back
seat to the determination of whether a situation fits into a particu-
lar state's dram shop act scheme. Thus, the most legally signifi-
cant legislative act is the repeal or enactment of a dram shop act.
A repeal usually has the effect of reinstating either a traditional
or modern common law scheme, whereas the enactment of a
dram shop act imposes an arbitrary classification system that pro-
vides windfalls to persons fortunate enough not to fall into legis-
lated classifications yet who may have been at fault.'4'
135. See supra note 133.
136. This was codified in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1984),
which provides as follows:
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 25602, a cause of action may
be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death
against any person licensed pursuant to Section- 23300 who sells, fur-
nishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic
beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or
giving of such beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the per-
sonal injury or death sustained by such person.
For a critique of the impact of this statutory provision, see Slomanson, Emergence
of the "Tender Years" Doctrine: Too Young to Drink, But Capable of Escaping the
Civil Consequences?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1977) (article preceeded enactment
of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1).
137. 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
138. See, e.g., California Supreme Court Survey, The Constitutionality of Civil
Nonliability of Vendors and Social Hosts Serving Alcohol to Intoxicated Persons:
Cory v. Shierlohk 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 680, 784 (1982).
139. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 100-21 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 17.
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Courts' responses to dram shop acts have been mixed.142 Once
a dram shop act is in force, a court's role is reduced to that of an
interpreter. Hence, the responsibility for change falls on the leg-
islature to take the steps in restructuring this area of the law.143
IV. SOCIAL GOALS AND POLICIES
Before an intelligent decision can be made in this area of law,
certain precepts must be established. First, the problem must be
identified. Second, the goals to be achieved must be decided
upon. Finally, the method to solve the problem must be chosen.
The act pertinent to this discussion is the provision of alcohol to
a person who subsequently injures another due to an intoxicated
condition. Although society may morally dislike the intoxication
of its members, it is the injury resulting from such intoxication
that must be the focus of society's concern. 44 All other consider-
ations, though they may be important, are secondary to the injury
caused. 45 The problem thus becomes whether society can allevi-
ate injury caused by an intoxicant.
The two stages surrounding an injury that are of analytical in-
terest are before an injury, and after an injury. During these
times, society has different controls over an individual. If society
142. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
143. In states where there is no dram shop legislation, it is within the court's
power to change the law. The legislatures of these states, however, still have the
power to legislate. It logically follows that in these states either branch of govern-
ment may take steps to change the law to a cohesive system that conforms to stan-
dards of fault and compensating fairness.
144. This is supported by court-enunciated reasons for enacting a dram shop
act. Courts have found that a reason for passing dram shop acts is that public pol-
icy mandates the control of liquor in order to protect the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the public. See, e.g., Lichter v. Scher, 11 Ill. App. 2d 441, 138 N.E.2d 66
(1956); Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 172 N.W.
2d 137 (Iowa 1969) (overruled to the extent that the court refused to recognize a
common law cause of action, Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977)); Putney v.
Gibson, 94 Mich. App. 466, 289 N.W.2d 837 (1979). "The liquor laws ... are plainly
designed to protect the welfare, health, peace, temperance, and safety of all the
citizens by providing for the strict regulation and control of the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of alcoholic beverages." Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 570, 596 P.2d
705, 708 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Mendelsohn v. Superior Ct., 76 Ariz. 163, 169,
261 P.2d 983, 988 (1953)) (emphasis added by Lewis court).
145. This, however, may be contra depending on the social values of a state.
Kansas, a state without a dram shop act, has nevertheless passed an act imposing
civil liability on wholesalers and distributors for violating rules governing the geo-
graphical scheme of sales within the state. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1981) (in ad-
dition to fines, if a violator is found to be attempting to control prices treble
damages plus attorney's fees may be recovered).
is to attempt to alleviate injury, then its goal before an injury
takes place would be that of deterrence.146 There is no method
that exists to undo an act, so the sole consideration after injury
becomes only to alleviate the injury through compensation. Thus,
society's goals are deterrence before injury and compensation
afterwards.
The task becomes: by what methods can these goals of society
be implemented? The goal of deterrence may be achieved by pe-
nal statutes147 imposing punishment148 severe enough to make
most people choose not to do an act.149 The effectiveness of a pe-
nal statute in deterring an action is thus dependent upon the se-
verity of the punishment. 50 Imposing civil liability for an act can
146. "Can there be any doubt that the purpose in prohibiting the bar owner
from selling liquor to a person who is already intoxicated is to prevent him from
becoming even more intoxicated, so that he is not a greater risk when he leaves
the bar?" Lewis, 122 Ariz. at 571, 596 P.2d at 708 (emphasis added).
147. For an excellent writing on this point, see United States v. Bergman, 416 F.
Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sentencing memorandum). District Judge Frankel dis-
cussed, at length, the basis for the penal sanction of imprisonment. This discus-
sion is equally applicable to the sanction of fines.
The court agrees that this defendant should not be sent to prison for
"rehabilitation." Apart from the patent inappositeness of the concept to
this individual, this court shares the growing understanding that no one
should ever be sent to prison for rehabilitation. That is to say, nobody
who would not otherwise be locked up should suffer that fate on the in-
congruous premise that it will be good for him or her. Imprisonment is
punishment. Facing the simple reality should help us to be civilized. It is
less agreeable to confine someone when we deem it to be an affliction
rather than a benefaction.
Contrary to [the defendant's] counsel's submissions, however, .. sen-
tencing considerations demand a prison sentence in this case:
First, the aim of general deterrence the effort to discourage similar
wrongdoing by others through a reminder that the law's warnings are real
and that the grim consequence of imprisonment is likely to follow from
crimes of deception for gain like those defendant has admitted.
Id. at 498-99 (second set of emphasis added). For reactions to the Bergman case,
see N.Y. Times, June 19, 1976, at 46, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1976, at A22, col. 2.
148. Oftentimes one may wonder if this goal is aspired to. A statute that im-
poses a minute fine is hard to classify as a punishing statute. Also, if practical
considerations make the imposition of a fine almost impossible, the statute has lit-
tle punitive value. For example, Louisiana imposes a $10 to $50 fine on one who
serves a beverage to a "habitual drunkard." "However the penalty shall not be in-
curred unless previous notice is given in person before witnesses, in writing, or
through the public prints, by publication every day for fifteen days, that the per-
son to whom the alcoholic beverage is sold or given is an inebriate." LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 26:683 (West 1975).
149. For a detailed empirical study focusing on the French system, and on the
deterrent effects of laws, see Ross, McCleary & Epperlein, Deterrence of Drinking
and Driving in France: An Evaluation of the Law of July 12, 1978, 16 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 345 (1982). In conclusion it was found that the deterrent effect that was pro-
duced was lost once the perceived threat was found to be bogus, since the deter-
rent was not enforced or applied as advertised.
150. See generally Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 557 n.11, 476 A.2d at 1226 n.11 (re-
viewing the results of strengthened laws and enforcement efforts in New Jersey).
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have similar consequences.151 The knowledge that one will be lia-
ble for the damages or injuries one causes should deter152 an indi-
vidual from such actions. 153
The goal of compensation can best be achieved by imposing
civil liability on persons who cause an event.154 In this way, those
who compensate an injury are those who were involved in the in-
jury.15 5 An equitable apportionment of liability among those who
cause injury156 should be predicated on the concept of fault. 157
For an overall view of the problem of deterring the drinking driver, see Ross, De-
terring the Drinking Driver: A Critique of Blennerhassett, 3 Brarr. J. L & Soc'Y 255
(1976).
151. Courts have stated that the reason for passing dram shop acts was to pro-
vide a deterrent to actions, as a means of providing additional incentive for the
suppliers of alcoholic beverages to avoid providing alcohol to the people covered
by these statutes. See, e.g., Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 54 111. 2d 127, 295
N.E.2d 718 (1973).
The "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been quite impor-
tant in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compen-
sation of the victim... there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the
occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for imposing liability
is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 22 (4th ed. 1971).
152. See supra note 150.
153. See supra note 151.
154. "[T]he [Civil Damage Act] by the imposition of the sanction of strict lia-
bility provides an extremely effective incentive for liquor vendors to do everything
in their power to avoid making illegal sales." Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281
Minn. 417, 423, 161 N.W.2d 657, 661 (1968) (the court expressed this deterrence mo-
tive while analyzing the strict liability, and contributory aspects of vendor
liability).
155. For courts holding that the primary objective of dram shop acts is to pro-
vide satisfactory compensation to an injured party, see Federated Mut. Implement
and Hardware Ins. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 172 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa 1969) (overruled
to the extent that the court refused to recognize a common law cause of action,
Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1977)) (the dram shop act was designed
to deter, "but above all to provide an avenue of relief to those offended who had no
recourse or right of action under the common law"); Anderson v. Comardo, 107
Misc. 2d 821, 828, 436 N.Y.S.2d 669, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (the dram shop act may have
been motivated by deterrence in part: "one of their primary goals was to assure
that persons injured in person or support by the intemperance of others would
have an available avenue of recovery for their injuries. . . .") (citations omitted).
156. This is contrary to existing dram shop law where certain persons could not
be held liable in an action for contribution. See, e.g., Friend v. Campbell, 102 Mich.
App. 278, 301 N.W.2d 503 (1981) (intoxicated person cannot seek contribution).
Compare Putney v. Gibson, 94 Mich. App. 466, 289 N.W.2d 837 (1979), rev'd, Putney
v. Haskins, 414 Mch. 181, 324 N.W.2d 729 (1979), with Herrera v. Voris, 365 F. Supp.
744 (E.D. Mich. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1974), where the first case did
not allow the tavern keeper to maintain a right against the intoxicated customer
for contribution, while the second case allowed an intoxicated customer to suc-
cessfully maintain a right of contribution against a tavern keeper.
157. Contribution is an equitable doctrine. A common burden of wrongful acts
Payment should be apportioned according to fault. 5 8 In sum, so-
ciety can best achieve the goal of deterrence through imposing
penal sanctions and civil liability, and its goal of compensation
through civil liability.l5 9
There are practical realities and other considerations that affect
the problem's solution. Relationships between society's mem-
bers, such as insurers and insureds, can alter incentives and moti-
vations. 160 Also, specific circumstances require specialized
methods to equitably dispose of the parties' responsibilities.16
For this reason, an ideal system would be one that is flexible and
capable of providing equitable solutions in specific instances. Our
legal system possesses this case-by-case flexibility.162
One practical effect on a civil liability system is that imposed by
insurance. If a commercial provider of alcohol buys insurance,
then the cost of this insurance will be incurred as a business cost.
To maintain profits, commercial providers of alcohol will incorpo-
rate this business cost into their pricing structure. In effect, the
cost of insurance will be borne, not by the true provider of alco-
hol, but by the buyers of alcohol.163 This, however, is not a prob-
lem when dealing with the compensatory goal of society, because
insurance is used to compensate the injured.164 In the interest of
implies a common burden of liability. See, e.g., Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274
N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. 1978). See also Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161
N.W.2d 657 (1968) ("There appears [to be] no valid reason to permit other ven-
dors, whose illegal sales have combined to cause the loss, to escape liability while
casting the burden solely upon one." Id. at 423, 161 N.W.2d at 661.).
158. For allocation of damages among providers, see, e.g., Skaja v. Andrews Ho-
tel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968) (suppliers considered concurrent tort-
feasors); Rubel v. Stockrow, 72 Misc. 2d 734, 340 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (plain-
tiff has option of joining provider defendants or maintaining an action against each
for the full satisfaction).
159. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim,
but with admonition of the wrongdoer .... [T] here is of course a strong
incentive to prevent the occurrence of harm. Not infrequently one reason
for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive
This idea of prevention shades into that of punishment of the offender
for what he has already done....
PROSSER, supra note 151 at § 4, 23.
160. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
162. See upra note 126.
163. It has even been argued that public policy demands that the very ability of
the supplier to insure against the risk of loss should impose the cost of loss. Ham-
merschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. 1978); Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co.,
281 Minn. 417, 423, 161 N.W.2d 657, 661 (1968).
164. See supra note 155. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has noted:
[T]he financial impact of an insurance premium increase on the home-
owner or the tenant should be measured against the monumental financial
losses suffered by society as a result of drunken driving. By our decision
we not only spread some of that loss so that it need not be borne com-
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fairness, the source of funds to compensate should not come from
one who is a collateral party to the injury. Buyers, however, are
the very people who, as a class, potentially are part of the chain of
causation of injury.
Another aspect of insurance is that although the goal of com-
pensation is achieved, the power of civil liability to deter is re-
duced. Civil liability should deter the occurrence of an injury to
the extent that persons would look ahead to the prospect of hav-
ing to pay for their actions, and then refrain from those actions if
the cost were too great.165 In this area of law, the latent cost of
potential injuries caused by intoxicated persons would be the de-
terrent to unleashing overly intoxicated persons upon the world.
If insurance is purchased by a provider of alcohol, except for
threatened increases in insurance premiums (which can be ab-
sorbed by buyers of alcohol through higher prices), the practical
deterrent effect of civil liability is largely defeated.
In a world with insurance, a civil liability system cannot cope
with the dual goals of the compensation for injury and the deter-
rence of injury. This forces a search for alternate methods of ful-
filling the deterrent effect. Deterrence can also be achieved by
the imposition of penal sanctions,166 with the deterrent effect be-
ing directly proportional to the severity of the penalties im-
posed.167 Penal sanctions may not be insured against, therefore
their deterrent effect remains.1 68 Thus, penal sanctions must be
implemented to create a legal system that meets both goals.
A consideration affecting the method by which society can at-
tain its goals and alleviate injury caused by an intoxicated person
is the role of the provider of alcohol. A provider of alcohol may be
a commercial seller or a social host. A commercial seller of alco-
hol has absolute control over the alcohol that is dispensed. Usu-
ally, the persons who are to consume the alcohol are visible to the
provider, and sales are small enough to control by the exercise of
pletely by the victims of this widespread affliction, but, to some extent, re-
duce the likelihood that the loss will occur in the first place.
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 557, 476 A.2d at 1229.
165. See supra note 150.
166. See supra note 147.
167. See supra note 150.
168. The policy of the law is to protect the public from the social consequences
of intoxicating liquor, thus a proprietor of a liquor establishment must recognize
the risks that flow from his business.
the right of refusal of service. 169 A commercial seller is exper-
ienced in selling alcohol, and in dealing with drinking persons.
Furthermore, a commercial seller has voluntarily entered the
business of making a profit170 through the provision of alcohol,
and thus has a responsibility for the situation he has voluntarily
created. On the other hand, while a social host may theoretically
have control over the alcohol that is dispensed, in practice this is
usually not the case. The refusal to serve drinks takes on differ-
ent dimensions in the case of a social host provider. A social host
does not serve alcohol as frequently as a commercial vendor, and
is not as experienced in dealing with drunken people and thus
cannot be expected to know when a person has met his or her
limit. 17 1 Furthermore, the potential legal repercussions of throw-
ing even a small party would be an oppressive burden.
An additional difference between commercial and social provid-
ers of alcohol is the aspect of insurability. A social host cannot be
expected to buy insurance to cover liability for the providing of al-
cohol. The deterrent effect that civil liability imposes upon the
social host is thereby not foiled by the ownership of insurance. 72
Therefore, if penal sanctions are imposed upon a social host, the
social host is doubly penalized in relation to the commercial ven-
dor. A commercial vendor really feels only the penal sanctions as
a deterrent, while a social host is subject to both the penal sanc-
tions and civil liability as deterrents. Hence, if penal sanctions
are used to deter, these sanctions should be limited to commer-
cial vendors.173 This would provide fairer treatment among the
different types of providers of alcohol.
169. See, e.g., Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 95 N.W.2d 657 (1959).
But see Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224 (a provider's motive
does not change the duty not to create unreasonable foreseeable risks of injury).
170. The very capacity to bear loss, either because of size or the ability to let
society absorb the loss, has been a motivating factor in finding ways to hold par-
ties with such capacity liable. This is considered a preferable approach to that of
leaving the loss on the shoulders of an individual plaintiff. PROSSER, supra note
151, § 4, at 22.
171. By virtue of his position, a commercial vendor is better able to cope with
the decision. This is important because knowledge of the plaintiff's intoxicated
condition is often required before liability will be imposed. See supra notes 110,
111.
172. It should be noted, however, that a social host could arguably be covered
against losses through homeowners insurance policies. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96
N.J. at 549-51, 476 A.2d at 1225.
173. The dependence of the goals of society on the role of the provider of alco-
hol can be summarized by the table:
Role
Goal Social Host Commercial Vendor
Deterrence Civil liability Penal sanctions
Compensation Civil liability Civil liability
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In summation, the problem of whether injury by an intoxicated
person can be alleviated is capable of solution by pursuing certain
goals. These goals are to deter actions which would lead to injury,
and to compensate injury after its occurrence. The methods cho-
sen to achieve these goals, and how those methods are to be ap-
plied, are dependent upon practical realities and considerations.
The use of insurance and the classification of a provider as either
a commercial seller or a social host are factors that justify the use
of particular methods. Civil liability is a method that serves the
goal of compensation in all situations. However, the impractical-
ity of the social host to insure himself, and the ability of the com-
mercial vendor to do so, creates justification for contrasting
treatment. Civil liability is a sufficient deterrent for the social
host. Since insurance removes the deterrence value of civil liabil-
ity for the commercial vendor, penal sanctions are appropriate.
However, penal sanctions should be limited to commercial sellers
since imposition of these sanctions would impose a double deter-
rent to the social host.
V. A SUGGESTED DRAM SHOP ACT
Since the inception of the automobile, the potential injuries
that can be produced by the intoxicated driver cannot be ig-
nored.174 Providers of alcohol are a powerful ally in the fight
against alcohol-related injuries. 175 They can no longer be given a
preferential position under the law.176 Under traditional common
law principles and legislated dram shop acts, providers of alcohol
have been earmarked for specialized treatment. Dram shop acts
are rife with inequities and arbitrary provisions.177 Social hosts,
owners or lessees of buildings, and minors have typically been
singled out for specialized treatment in many dram shop acts;
they have either been arbitrarily excluded from the responsibili-
174. See supra notes 1-4.
175. See, e.g., Note, Civil Damages Act-Preemption of Social Hosts' Common
Law Liability: Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N. W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982), 5
HAUNE L. REV. 489, 496 (1982).
176. An intermediate court stated with respect to the traditional common law
rule: "This does not mean, however, that we cannot criticize a rule that is patently
unsupportable by either accepted fundamental legal principles or by logic and is
contrary to present tort concepts . . . ." Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 568, 596 P.2d
705, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (overruled in Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 508,
667 P.2d 200, 208 (Ariz. 1983)).
177. See supra notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
ties of liability, or held subject to liability. Furthermore, if a pro-
vider does become liable, the extent of liability is for the the
entire injury.178 Traditional common law and dram shop acts not
only lack flexibility,179 but also fail to provide equitable results in
all circumstances due to the categorization of circumstances. 80 A
system in which the most contingencies can be adjudged equita-
bly is needed.
Modern common law would theoretically provide the necessary
flexibility to deal with all the circumstances in a particular
case.181 It has the capacity to deal with cases equitably, and can
impose liability based upon fault.182 In practice, however, the de-
velopment of the modern common law has been incomplete. 8 3
Either arbitrary classifications have been formed, resulting in the
absolute denial of a cause of action by an intoxicated person
against a provider, or the law has not matured completely into a
pure common law system.184
Legislative action is needed to alleviate the apparent inconsis-
tencies developing in the common law. 85 Dram shop acts have
178. See, e.g., League v. Ehmke, 120 Iowa 464, 94 N.W. 938 (1903) (defendant con-
tributed to the plaintiffs husband's intoxication and the plaintiff was allowed to
recover for injury to her health caused by the husband's threats to her of great
bodily injury made in the presence of their children); Fleming v. Gemein, 168
Mich. 541, 134 N.W. 969 (1912) (wife was allowed to recover for injuries, incurred in
an assault by an intoxicated husband, from a provider of alcohol).
179. [Ilt would be well to remember the function of common law judges
and the role of the common law. The main characteristic of the common
law is its dynamism. It does not remain static. The common law is not a
thing of chiseled marble to be left unchanged for centuries.
Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 568, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (overruled in
Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 508, 667 P.2d 200, 208 (Ariz. 1983)).
180. "It seems clear that the common law rule is an anachronism, unsuitable to
our present society, and that its reasoning is repugnant to modem tort theories."
Id. at 570, 596 P.2d at 708.
181. Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle which allows it to
grow and to tailor itself to meet changing needs within the doctrine of
stare decisis, which, if correctly understood, was not static and did not for-
ever prevent the courts from reversing themselves or from applying prin-
ciples of common law to new situations as the need arose. If this were not
so, we must succumb to a rule that a judge should let others "long dead
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives, do his thinking
for him."
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1961) (quoting Douglas,
Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949), an article adapted from a lecture
given by Mr. Justice Douglas) (footnote omitted).
182. This comes from the ability to judge cases individually on their real merit.
Judges and juries can incorporate the concept of the totality of the circumstances
in making each particular decision.
183. In the jurisdictions where such law has been adopted, states continue to
rely upon the imposition of liability based on statute, see, e.g., supra notes 69-74
and accompanying text, or legislative action has arrested the development of the
law, see, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984).
184. See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
185. When a dram shop act is in force it would be rendered inoperative if an
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only changed the law to the extent that they have shifted arbi-
trary and inequitable provisions within the law.186 A more flexi-
ble system providing equitable solutions under the most
circumstances is needed.
The common law concepts must be legislated187 into the dram
shop acts. All persons at fault should be potentially liable for the
injuries they have caused. Thus, concepts of contributory negli-
gence would have to be incorporated into the statutes. Further-
more, all providers, regardless of their role as either social host or
commercial seller, must be subject to liability. This does not make
providers of alcohol necessarily liable, but makes them amenable
to suit.188 Once a provider becomes such, this does not imply he
alone should shoulder the full burden of liability. Concepts of
contributory and comparative negligence should apply, along with
notions of joint and several liability. 89 Other factors which some
alternate legal cause of action were allowed to exist contemporaneously. Thus, a
dram shop act usually preempts the law in the area of actions against a provider of
alcohol. See, e.g., Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1982) (dram shop leg-
islation usurped the common law negligence action that existed).
186. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
187. 'Those cases that have refused to abrogate the common law rule have
done so either by adhering to it without analyzing its rationale or by citing the
need for legislative action." 122 Ariz. at 571, 596 P.2d at 709. See also supra notes
44-46 and accompanying text.
188. For an argument propounding the point that merely accompanying and
drinking with a person who becomes intoxicated should not preclude dram shop
liability in a state with an existing dram shop act, see Nelson v. Araiza, 69 Ill. 2d
534, 372 N.E.2d 637 (1977); Todd v. Biglow, 51 Mich. App. 346, 214 N.W.2d 733 (1974).
189. This principle was enunciated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the
context of the issue of contribution between the intoxicated person and the tavern
keeper. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230
(1966).
[Tihere is no question that the driver of the automobile [intoxicated per-
son] and the vendor making the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor are
jointly liable to the injured parties. It is true that liability rests on differ-
ent legal grounds. One rests on common-law negligence and the other on
a Civil Damage Act: [a dram shop act]. But the liability of both is com-
mon to the injured party. Action for recovery against one does not bar ac-
tion against the other, but there can be no double recovery and payment
by one relieves the other pro tanto of liability up to the amount paid. We
have held in several cases that plaintiff is entitled to only one full recov-
ery, and if one of the tortfeasors is sued first, whatever is recovered in that
action must be offset against any recovery against the other tortfeasor in a
subsequent action. If it is true that one full recovery sets the limit against
both tortfeasors, the question naturally arises-why should they not each
be liable for their fair share inter se, whether they are sued in the same
action or separately, when the action is finally determined or settled so
there can be no further action against any of the parties?
Id. at 251, 143 N.W.2d at 234. But see Virgilio v. Hartfleld, 4 Mich. App. 282, 145
states have felt to be of concern, such as written notice to a tavern
keeper, the fact that a minor is involved, and obvious intoxication,
would be factors in the consideration of the circumstances on a
case-by-case basis.190
Each state's law dealing with the area of provider liability is
unique. Therefore, each state would need to draft a statute tai-
lored to its particular needs. The aim of these statutes should be
to eradicate pre-existing arbitrary classifications of circumstances
that shackle the equitable distribution of liability by imposing a
pure system of common law liability. Bearing in mind the prem-
ise that each state has a specific set of problems to solve, a sug-
gested dram shop act may take on the following form:
Any person, suffering an injury recognized by the law, and caused by an
intoxicated person, may have a civil right of action against any person
who caused any part of the intoxication of that intoxicated person by pro-
viding, in any manner, alcoholic beverages to that intoxicated person. A
civil right of action shall not be either denied or allowed based solely on
distinctions based on the role of a party as either social host, commercial
vendor or otherwise. These factors may, however, be properly considered
in determining the existence of liability if they are incorporated in an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether standards
of reasonable care by a person of ordinary prudence were met. All parties
can be made to share in liability based upon principles of joint and several
liability and contributory or comparative negligence prevailing in this
state.
This statute should be accompanied by a statement of legisla-
tive intent. It should be made clear to the courts that the purpose
of the act is to provide for an application of law without arbitrary
distinctions.191 The legislature may also consider monitoring the
courts to prevent their slipping into traditional common law dis-
tinctions through amending the act whenever necessary. The
purpose of the statute is to provide a system of liability that is co-
hesive with the area of tort law, thereby providing an equivalent
N.W.2d 367 (1966) (policy rests on the rule that the right of contribution between
tortfeasors must arise under a responsibility to the plaintiff that comes from a
common law theory of liability).
190. Judge Prather, in his dissent in Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d
54 (1969) (overruled in Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980)), criti-
cized the traditional common law rule as follows:
Some courts cling steadfastly to the myth that it is the drinking and not
the sale that is the proximate cause of the ensuing injury and are wearing
blinders when it comes to observing the ordinary course of human events.
... The underlying principle ... is that the seller is sending out into the
public a thing of danger which a reasonably prudent person under like cir-
cumstances would apprehend would be likely to cause injury to someone
else.
Id. at 472-73, 462 P.2d at 64-65 (Prather, J., dissenting).
191. The following factors may effect a decision of whether or not liability
should be imposed: The moral aspect of defendant's conduct; historical develop-
ment; convenience of administration; capacity to bear loss; and prevention and
punishment. PROSSER, supra note 151, § 4, at 22.
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level of fairness.192
The first part of the suggested dram shop act creates a civil
right of action. It then directs the courts to remove all distinc-
tions based solely on the role of the provider of alcohol.193 While
the role of the provider may be considered as a factor that may
affect the common law standards imposing liability,194 the statute
also negates the notion that certain persons should necessarily
shoulder the entire liability in a particular case.195 Instead, pre-
vailing principles of joint and several liability are used. Further-
more, the concepts of contributory or comparative negligence are
specifically included in the scheme of liability to prompt those
states that force a provider to bear the full liability, despite the
partial fault of the intoxicated, into the adoption of a complete
common law system.196
192. This "fairness" would be encompassed in the "social engineering" aspect
of the tort field. For a discussion of the role of torts in the area of social engineer-
ing, see PROSSER, supra note 195, at 14-16.
193. The interrelationship of factors is important. For example, if the providers
of alcohol are meant to include anyone who provides alcohol, and the part of the
statute that defines what type of provision qualifies (i.e., giving, bartering, selling,
etc...) omits the concept of "giving gratuitously" then a social host becomes im-
mune. This would occur despite an original intent to include the social host. Cf.
Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982) (Alcohol bought to entertain a cli-
ent's personnel did not qualify as a barter. Thus, the law firm was not liable as a
provider of alcohol, based upon the specific removal of the word "giving" from the
dram shop act indicating that social hosts were not liable under the act).
194. Courts in states that have dram shop acts have used as their justification
for the existence of a dram shop law the fact that liability is imposed based upon
the foreseeability of harm caused by intoxicated individuals. See, e.g., Ono v. Ap-
plegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Friend v. Campbell, 102 Mich. App. 278,
301 N.W.2d 503 (1981). However, depending on the circumstances, some injuries
are more foreseeable than others, and some injuries are not foreseeable at all. So
if foreseeability was the real premise for dram shop acts, then they would not
have been drafted to include cases where injury is not foreseeable. The justifica-
tion of the court for dram shop acts has merit and should be incorporated into an
act. See generally Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
195. For suppliers' contribution among themselves, see, e.g., Duncan v. Beres,
15 Mich. App. 318, 166 N.W.2d 678 (1968); Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. 1978); Rubel v. Stackrow, 72 Misc. 2d 734, 340 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
196. This is contra to states having dram shop acts in which the negligence of
the intoxicated is not a defense since the cause of action is statutory in form and
thus not based on negligence. In the case of existing dram shop acts that provide
for actions by wives, husbands, children or parents, a defense based upon the neg-
ligence of the intoxicated fails since the cause of action is not derivative in form
but exists in the wife, husband, child or parent in their own right. See, e.g., Schutz
v. Murphy, 99 Mich. App. 386, 297 N.W.2d 676 (1980) (wife could maintain a suit de-
spite the husband's preclusion from recovering damages for his own injuries);
Vadasy v. Bill Feigel's Tavern, Inc., 88 Misc. 2d 614, 391 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
affd, 55 A.D. 1011, 391 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1977) (a father was permitted to bring an ac-
This suggested statute is based upon the more common differ-
ences between the positions most states have adopted and an un-
fettered common law system.197 In providing for an unrestricted
application of the common law, some states may not require all of
the provisions in this statute, and others may need more.
A dram shop act alone is inadequate. As previously discussed,
commercial vendors of alcoholic beverages can purchase insur-
ance to cover their potential losses under a dram shop act.' 98
Consequently, the deterrent effect of dram shop acts is negated.
Furthermore, the social host who cannot be expected to purchase
insurance is treated harshly relative to the commercial vendor.
Thus, a dram shop act alone cannot provide an equitable legal
system. An equitable system would require that a dram shop act
be accompanied by a penal statute imposing sanctions against
commercial vendors. The penal statute should be limited to sanc-
tions against commercial vendors, because if social hosts who did
not buy insurance were included under the penal statute, social
hosts would again be treated inequitably relative to commercial
vendors.
To provide fairness and equity to all classes of providers, an in-
tegrated system is required. A penal code providing sanctions
against commercial vendors together with a dram shop act pro-
vides such a system. 99 The severity of penal sanctions should be
strong enough to deter commercial vendors to the same extent as
other providers of alcohol.200 Otherwise, if the deterrent effect of
the penal sanction is less than that of the dram shop act, social
tion for the loss of services of his child despite the inability of the boy to bring an
action in his own name). This rule does not include recovery by another who ac-
tively causes part of the intoxication. This is the defense of complicity. See, e.g.,
Nelson v. Araiza, 69 Ill. 2d 534, 372 N.E.2d 637 (1977).
197. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
198. For cases that construed dram shop liability insurance provisions, see Lin-
coln Casualty Co. v. Vic & Mario's, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 2d 262, 210 N.E.2d 329 (1965)
(insurance policy was found to cover only on the premises drinking); Dorsey v.
Kriloff, 319 Ill. App. 116, 48 N.E.2d 768 (1943) (insurance policy was found not to
cover an employee).
199. Penal sanctions cannot be made part of a dram shop act, because dram
shop acts impose civil liability and not penal sanctions. 45 AM. JuR. 2d Intoxicat-
ing Liquors, § 561 (1969).
200. When studying the awards available under civil liability acts, the state leg-
islatures should examine the nature and extent of the awards available in their
state. In Illinois, a daughter brought suit against the provider of alcohol that sold
her the alcohol which caused her intoxication. She brought the suit on behalf of
her parents claiming she had been supporting them and thus her parents had lost
their means of support. Kelly v. Hughes, 33 Ill. App. 2d 314, 179 N.E.2d 273 (1962).
See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d
36 (1963) (in determining the amount of the award for the loss of means of support
consideration of habits, condition of family, health, and earning capacity of sup-
porter, life expectancies of supporter and supportee, was proper).
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hosts would again be treated more harshly than commercial ven-
dors. Conversely, if the deterrent effect of the penal sanction is
stronger than that of the dram shop act, commercial vendors
would be treated more harshly than social hosts. To match the
deterrent effect of a dram shop act, state legislatures may look to
the amount of the average liability incurred in a recovery under
the dram shop act in the state.201 This value may be used to set a
fine under the penal code. In this way the deterrent effect that
comes to bear on commercial vendors can be equalized with the
effect experienced by social hosts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The mechanization of today's society has brought a new dimen-
sion to the potential injury an intoxicated person can cause. The
degree of legislation society wishes to produce to stop or punish
the drunk driver is a political question. Courts and legislatures
alike have created a morass of arbitrary distinctions and categori-
zations of persons within the law upon which liability is either de-
nied or imposed. Society can no longer afford to allow this
important area of the law to remain in a state of disarray.202 With
the severity and number 203 of intoxicated-caused injuries,
lawmakers have a duty to clean house.
Under traditional common law, the providers of alcohol are ab-
solutely immune from liability.204 Under state-enacted dram shop
201. If the levels of deterrence were equal then a provider would not be dis-
criminated against based on his role as either a commercial supplier or social host.
However, this is a policy decision and it may well be that society may want to de-
ter one party to a greater extent. For example, a commercial enterprise may have
a better ability to absorb loss than the social host. Entities "Who by means of
rates, prices, taxes or insurance are best able to distribute to the public at large
the risks and losses which are inevitable" may be chosen to bear that loss. PRos-
SER, supra note 151, at 22.
202. "The dram shop rule was promulgated by the courts in horse and buggy
days. The attitude that the plaintiff's rights are limited to the remedies available
at common law must yield when the rationale for the rule no longer applies."
Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 571, 596 P.2d 705, 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (overruled in
Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 508, 667 P.2d 200, 208 (Ariz. 1983)).
203. Judges who handle these types of cases understand the realities of injuries
caused by intoxicated persons, however, their decisions have been limited by
higher authority. Exasperated, one judge prefaced his opinion with the biting re-
mark. "This is another one of those cases where an innocent life has been snuffed
out by a drunk driver." Id. at 567, 596 P.2d at 705 (the judge was forced to deny
liability).
204. If legal liability is to coincide with moral wrong, what can be said in
favor of the barkeeper who serves intoxicants to someone who is already
acts, there are numerous arbitrary classifications and distinctions
that determine a provider's candidacy for liability.205 Both these
systems lack the requisite flexibility to impose liability in an equi-
table manner.206 The modern common law is a move towards a
system of liability which is not based upon arbitrary distinctions.
However, the modern common law has rarely matured in states in
which it has been introduced. The law usually remains depen-
dent upon the existence of penal statutes. Even when a state has
managed to move into an area of unfettered common law, the leg-
islature has explicitly overruled the development by the courts. 207
Before making changes in this area of the law, the problem
must be evaluated, then goals must be set to solve the problem
and methods used to achieve these goals discovered. The basic
problem is the question of whether society can alleviate injury
caused by an intoxicated person. The goals that are appropriate
to the solution of this problem are the deterrence of actions that
cause injuries and the compensation of injuries when they occur.
To equitably achieve the goals of deterrence and compensation,
civil liability must be administered unfettered by arbitrary dis-
tinctions. To force legal systems of states into such an unfettered
system, legislation is needed.208 Legislation should impose an un-
hampered common law system, and explicitly remove the inequi-
ties which exist in a state's system. Any enactment of a dram
shop act should be part of an integrated system. The practical re-
ality of insurance inherently produces a significant difference be-
tween the commercial vendor and other providers of alcohol.209
To create an equitable system, penal statutes that impose sanc-
tions against commercial vendors should be enacted in tandem
with dram shop acts. This would equalize the deterrent effect be-
tween commercial vendors, who can insure themselves against li-
ability, and social hosts, who do not have access to such
insurance.
intoxicated when he knows or should have reason to know that upon leav-
ing the bar that person will unleash an instrument of potential destruc-
tion? Such anti-social conduct cries out for legal liability.
Id. at 571, 596 P.2d at 709.
205. See supra notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1984).
208. The fact that courts cling to the traditional common law is evidence of the
fact that they will not move to the common law. Exceptions are few. See, e.g., Lo-
pez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (the problem of maintaining a cause
of action on the sole theory that there was a violation of a statute remains). How-
ever, as one court has noted the "immunization of hosts is not the inevitable result
of the law of negligence, for conventional negligence analysis points strongly in ex-
actly the opposite direction." Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
209. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
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The lethal mixture of an intoxicated driver and an automobile
makes this area of the law extremely important. The systems
that have developed to deal with the liability of the providers of
alcohol are inadequate and legislative change is needed. A coher-
ent system based upon notions of fairness and equity is a neces-
sity. This area of the law deserves a sober re-evaluation. 210
EMERY J. MISHKY
210. For persons whose "reason" is so hardened as to not be able to furnish a
sufficient basis of concern in this area of the law, a reading of the article Anger
and Action After the Tears, Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1982, at Hl, col. 1, may be
adequate to create sufficient empathy.

